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SHOULD LIABILITY BE BASED
ON THE HARM TO THE VICTIM
OR THE GAIN TO THE INJURER?
ABSTRACT
Should the level of liability imposed on an injurer be based on the harm he caused or
instead on the gain he obtained from engaging in the harmful act? The main point of this article
is that there is a strong reason to favor liability based on harm rather than gain when account is
taken of the possibility of legal error. Notably, even a small underestimate of gain can lead an
injurer to commit a harmful act when the harm greatly exceeds his gain, causing a large social
loss. In contrast, a comparable error in the estimate of harm will not lead an injurer to engage
in the harmful act when the harm significantly exceeds his gain. The general superiority of
harm-based liability is shown to hold under the rules of negligence and strict liability and
regardless of whether potential injurers know the error that will be made.
A. Mitchell Polinsky Steven Shavell
Stanford Law School Harvard Law School
Stanford, CA 94305 Cambridge, MA 02138
and NBER and NBER1. Introdtction
Should the level of liability imposed on an injurer be based on the harm
he caused or instead on the gain he obtained from his misconduct? For
example, if a person's failure to take a precaution that costs $1,000 results
in a harm of $10,000, should he be liable for the $10,000 harm or the $1,000
that he saved? If a firm violates a regulatory requirement and thereby
increases its profit, should the firm's liability equal the harm caused by the
violation or its additional profit?
The answer provided by the law to such questions is not uniform in
character. In tort and contract disputes, liability generally is based on the
victim's harm,1 although sometimes the injurer's gain is taken into account
(for example, in determining punitive damages in tort law and restitutionary
damages in contract law2). In criminal law and other governmental
enforcement contexts, liability often depends on harm, but also frequently on
gain (such as for noncompliance with certain environmental and financial
regulations) .
See,for example, American Jurisprudence (1988, p. 35) ("Generally, a
person who, tortiously or in breach of a contractual obligation, does an act
which has injurious consequences is liable for the damage caused by such
wrongful act." footnote omitted).
2Regardingpunitive damages, see, for example, Pacific Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1991) (in which the U.S. Supreme
Court endorsed a list of seven factors considered relevant to the size of a
punitive damage award, one of which was "the profitability to the defendant of
the wrongful conduct and the desirability of removing that profit and of
having the defendant also sustain a loss"). Regarding restitutionary damages,
see, for example, Farnsworth (1990, pp. 150-151) ("[T)he object of restitution
is ...theprevention of unjust enrichment. The focus is on the party in
breach rather than on the injured party The party in breach is required
to disgorge what that party has received in money or services ....").
Under guidelines promulgated by the United States Sentencing Commission
for individual defendants in criminal cases, courts are required to consider
in determining the amount of a fine "the need for the ...sentei.ceto reflect
-1-In this article we evaluate the efficacy of harm-based liabilityand
gain-based liability as means of deterring sociallyundesirable acts -- acts
for which an injurer's gain is less than the victim'sharm.4 Either measure
of liability will deter such acts in a legal system inwhich harm and gain are
correctly assessed. Harm-based liability accomplishes deterrencebecause the
harm from a socially undesirable act, and therefore the levelof liability,
will exceed the injurer's gain. Gain-based liability achieves the sameresult
by making the injurer disgorge his gain (or alittle more).
We will emphasize, however, that the two approaches differ greatly when
account is taken of errors that the legal system may make in calculating gain
and harm. In particular, gain-based liability will be shown to be seriously
flawed in the presence of legal error because it fails to deter many socially
undesirable acts. Harm-based liability, however, is not as susceptible to
this criticism and therefore generally is superior.
The problem with gain-based liability is that any underestimation of the
gain will in principle lead an individual to commit an undesirable act, no
matter how great the resulting harm may be. Suppose, for example, that an act
the seriousness of the offense (including the harm or loss to the victim and
the gain to the defendant), .. . SeeUnited States Sentencing Commission
(1987, p. 5.15). Sentences for organizational defendants also takeboth harm
and gain into account. Under the RICO (Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations) Act, N... a defendant who derives profits or other proceeds
from an offense may be fined not more than twice the gross profits or other
proceeds.N See United States Code, Title 18, Section l963(a)(3). Seealso
United States Code, Title 42, Section 7420(d)(2) (providing for environmental
noncompliance penalties at least equal to Nthe economic value which a delayin
compliance ...mayhave for the owner of the source of pollution) and
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Paul A. Bilzerian, et al. •814F.Supp.
116. 121 (1993) (an action by the SEC successfully seeking the disgorgementof
profits obtained by defendant Bilzerian through certain securities
transactions).
We also briefly consider compensation issues in comment (e) in Section
5 below.
-2-would produce a gain of $1,000 for an individual and that the gain is slightly
underestimated, say it is thought to be $950. Then the individual will be led
to commit the act -hewould profit by $50 -- regardlessof the harm, whether
it is $2,000, $20,000, or $200,000. In contrast, under harm-based liability,
the individual is not likely to commit the act when the harm greatly exceeds
his gain of $1,000, because his liability is likely to exceed $1,000 even if
the measurement of harm is subject to substantial error.
We will show that harm-based liability is superior to gain-based
liability under quite general assumptions about the probability distribution
of legal error and regardless of whether individuals know the magnitude of the
error before deciding whether to engage in the harmful act. Section 2
describes the basic framework of the analysis. Section 3 presents the results
under the negligence rule and Section 4 briefly considers the strict liability
rule. Section 5 contains concluding remarks.5
2. Basic Framework
Each individual in a population of risk-neutral individuals decides
whether to engage in an act that will result in a harm and a gain with
certainty. Both the harm and the gain vary among individuals. Let
g —gainto an individual if he engages in the act, g > 0;
h —harmcaused if the individuaj. engages in the act, h >0;
Wittman (1984, 1985) considers liability based on harm and liability
based on gain, but does not make the point that we emphasize here. His focus
is on which party -- theinjurer or the victim -- shoulddecide how much care
the injurer exercises. Parker (1989, pp. 554-563) and Gri.iner (1992, pp. 234-
263) informally discuss harm-based and gain-based liability in the context of
criminal sentencing policy for organizations. In addition, a number of
authors have studied the effects of legal errors on individual behavior under
liability rules, but take for granted that the level of liability is based on
harm. See, for example, Craswell and Calfee (1986).
-3-and assume that the joint probability density over gand h is positive for all
positive g and h. Individuals knowtheir own g and h.
If the social authority responsible for setting thelevel of liability
makes errors in observing the gain and/or the harm,the values it observes are
assumed to take the forms g +and h +rj, where
-y —errorin observing the gain;
—errorin observing the harm.
These errors have mean zero and are independent of oneanother.
An individual will engage in the harmful act if and onlyif his gain
exceeds his expected liability.6 The latter depends (in waysdescribed in
Sections 3 and 4 below) on the applicable liability rule and onwhether he
knows before he commits the act the errors that the social authoritywill make
in observing his gain and harm.
Social welfare is taken to be the sum of the gains less the harms
associated with the subset of individuals who commit harmful acts. Inthe
first-best outcome, every individual whose gain exceeds harm will engagein
the act, and every individual for whom the reverse is true willrefrain from
the act.
3. Analysis Under the Negligence Rule
Under the negligence rule, an individual is liable if and onlyif he is
negligent. An individual will be found negligent when his actis judged
socially undesirable, that is, when his observed gain, g +y,is less than the
6 We assume for simp].icity that he will not engage in the act if hi? gain
equals his expected liability.
-4-observed harm,h +
Wewill consider two alternative measures of liability under the
negligence rule: gain-based liability --equalto the observed value of the
injurer's gain, g +-.andharm-based liability -.equalto the observed
value of the victim's harm, h +r.These measures will be compared first when
there are no errors in estimation (when y and iareidentically zero), then
when there are errors and their values are known by individuals before they
decide whether to engage in the harmful act, and finally when there are errors
but their values are not knownbyindividuals in advance.
3.1. No Errors
In this case, an individual will be found negligent if and only if
g < h; liability then will be g under gain-based liability and h under harm-
basedliability.
Under gain-based liability, an individual will be deterred from engaging
in the act whenever g <h, for ifhe engages in it he will have to surrender
his gain.8 Similarly, under harm-based liability, an individual will be
deterred from engaging in the act whenever g <h, for ifhe engages in it he
will have to pay the harm, which exceeds his gain. Under both measures an
individual will engage in the act whenever g ￿ h since he will not be found
negligent. Thus, if there are no errors in observing gain or harm,thetwo
measuresof liability are equivalent. Moreover, the first-best outcome is
Although acts that are socially undesirable are described here as
negligent, the reader also could interpret them as criminal or as violations
of regulatory standards.
8Recallthat we have assumed for simplicity that an individual will not
engage in the act when he is indifferent. This assumption can be interpreted
as capturing the fact that 11 ability slightly in excess of gain would make the
injurer strictly prefer not to engage in the act.
-5-achieved.
3.2. Errors AnticiDated
We now assume that the social authority makes errors and that
individuals know what the errors are before deciding whether to engage in the
harmful act.
Suppose first that only the gain is observed witherror.9 Then if
g +ih, negligence will not be found and the measure of liability will be
irrelevant. Assume, therefore, that g +y<h,so negligence will be found.
Then under harm-based liability, since liability is h, an individual
will engage in the act if and only if g >h.Under gain-based liability, an
individual will, engage in the act whenever the gain is underestimated -- that
is, whenever 'y< 0.Relative to the outcome under harm-based liability, this
results in a social loss of h -gif g <h,and is equivalent to the outcome
under harm-based liability if g ￿ h. If the gain is overestimated, an
individual will be deterred under gain-based liability, as well as under harm-
based liability; the latter result follows because -'> 0and g +< h(the
maintained assumption that negligence will be found) imply that g <h.
The preceding discussion shows that when gain alone is observed with
error andtheerror is anticipated, harm-based liability is superior to gain-
based liability. In particular, if gain is underestimated, the gain-based
measure will lead an individual to enage in the harmful act even when his
gain is less than the harm (possibly much less than the harm); but under
harm-based liability, an individual never engages in the act when his gain is
less than the harm.
Because our principal interest is in errors in estimating the gain, we
will not consider in the text th situation when harm alone is subject to
error. However, this case is discussed in notes 11, 14, 15, and 16 below.
-6-Now suppose that both gain and harm are observed with error, when g +'y
￿ h +j, negligencewill not be found and the measure of liability will be
irrelevant, so again assume that negligence is found --thatg +-y<h+
Ifg ￿ g +'y,an individual will be deterred under both measures of
liability (since g ￿ g +-y< h +). Conversely,if g > h +r,an individual
will engage in the act under both measures. Only when g +'y< g h + r will
the two measures of liability differ in their effect -- anindividual will
engage in the act under gain-based liability but not under harm-based
liability.
The extra inducement to engage in the act under the gain-based measure
may in principle be undesirable or desirable. It will be undesirable if g <
h. This clearly is possible since g +<g < h < h + rj can occur if< 0
and>O; andg+<g<h+<hcanoccur if7<0andg-h<<O.
The added incentive to engage in the act will be desirable if g > h. This
also is possible because g +<h < g < h +qcan occur if < h -g< 0 and
-h>0;andh<g+i<g<h+canoccurifh -g<7<Oandfl>
g -h> 0. Thus, without further assumptions, it is not possible to say which
measure of liability is preferable.
Notwithstandingthat the two measurescannot be ranked unambiguously
when bothgainand harm are observed with error and the errors are
anticipated, thereisan importantsense inwhich harm-basedliability is
superior togain-basedliability: Let 'iNbethe maximum error that can occur
in observing gain and tlMbethe maximum error that can occur in observing
harm. It can be shown that, for any 'ia,harm-basedliability is superior to
-7-gain-based liability when 'lu is sufficientlylow.10 However, the converse is
not true; gain-based liability may be inferior to harm-based liability no
matter how small -is(as long as it is positive)." These results are
demonstrated in the appendix.
The explanation is in essence that even a small error in estimating gain
can cause a large social loss because such an error can lead an individual to
commit a harmful act when his gain is much less than the harm. In contrast, a
small error in estimating harm can cause only a small social loss because an
individual will commit the act only if his gain exceeds the estimate of the
harm, which (by hypothesis) is relatively close to the harm.
The advantage of harm-based liability can be illustrated by the
following numerical example. Suppose that there are one million individuals
in the population; that the gain from engaging in the harmful act varies
uniformly among them from $1 to $100 (by increments of a dollar); and that the
resulting harm also varies uniformly and independently from $1 to $100 (by
increments of a dollar). Then the level of social welfare in the first-best
outcome -- equivalently,the outcome when there are no errors in observing
gain or harm --canbe calculated to be $l6.665 million. Suppose the errors,
both positive and negative, in observing gain and harm are uniformly
distributed (by increments of a dollar) from zero to some upper bound --
Note that this result implies that harm-based liability is superior to
gain-based liability when the gain alone is subject to error, for then 'j— 0.
In the special case in which only the estimation of harm is subject to
error, gain-based liability and harm-based liability are equivalent: both
result in deterrence whenever negligence is found (for g <h+, impliesthat
an individual will not engage in the act regardless of whether he pays g or
h +,). Thisdoes not contradict the result stated in the text, since when
harm alone is subject to error, —0.
-8-for gain and yforharm.12 If y1 — $1.so that both gain and harm are
observed with only a small error, social welfare falls 32% under gain-based
liability, to $ll.270 million, but less than 1% under harm-based liability, to
$l&.658 million. Holding -y,, (the maximum error in observing gain) at $1 but
raising r (the maximum error in observing harm) to $25 does not significantly
affect this result; social welfare then is $lO.795 million under gain-based
liability (a 35% reduction from the first-best level) and $15.948 million
under harm-based liability (a 4% reduction). In other words, even when the
errors with respect to harm are large and the errors with respect to gain are
small, harm-based liability is strongly preferred to gain-based liability.
3.3. Errors Not Anticirated
In this case, we assume that individuals do not know what the social
authority's errors will be when deciding whether to engage in the harmful act;
they only know the distributions of the error terms.
With this information, an individual can compute the probability that he
will be found negligent if he engages in the act --thatis, the probability
that g + -y<h +given his g and h. Let p(g, h) represent this probability.
If p(g, h) is zero, the measure of liability is irrelevant, so we will
consider only g and h such that p(g, h) is positive.
An individual also can calculate the probability distribution of the
level of liability if there is a finding of negligence, tat Eg(g, h) denote
the expected value of the individual's liability under the gain-based measure,
conditional on negligence being found; and let Eh(g, h) be the corresponding
12 We assume that the maximum possible error is reduced whenever, given
the true value of the injurer's gain and the victim's harm, the observed
values of gain or harm otherwise would be less than $1 or greater than $100.
-9-expected value under the harm-based measure)3
Since g + -y < h +whenever negligence is found, it follows that
Eg(g, h) < Eh(g, h), so that p(g, h)Eg(g, h) < p(g, h)Eh(g, h). In other
words, the individual's expected liability is lower under the gain-based
measure. Consequently, if g < p(g, h)Eg(g, h), the individual will be
deterred from engaging in the harmful act under both measures of liability;
and if g > p(g, h)Eh(g, h), he will engage in the act under both. The
measures differ only if p(g, h)Eg(g, h) < g < p(g, h)Eh(g, h)
-inwhich case
an individual will engage in the act under gain-based liability but not under
harm-based liability. But then, engaging in the harmful act lowers social
welfare since g < p(g, h)Eh(g, h) ￿ h; the latter inequality follows from the
fact that if an individual were always found liable, his expected liability
under the harm-based measure would be the unconditional expected value of
h + i,whichis h.
We conclude, therefore, that when both gain and harm are observed with
error and the errors are not anticipated, harm-based liability issuperior to
gain-based liability)4 Note that the present argument favoring harm-based
liability is stronger, since it is unambiguous,thanthe argument when errors
are anticipated. In both cases, the problem with gain-based liability is that
it provides an added inducement to engage in the harmful act when an
individual's gain is less than the ham.
In other words, Eg(g, h) equals the expected value of g + y
conditionalon g + -i <h +i;andEh(g, h) equals the expected value of h + r
conditionalon g + -y<h + .
14This result implies that in the special cases in which gain alone or
harm alone is estimated with error, harm-based liability is superior to gain-
based liability.
-10-4. AnalYsis Under the Strict Liability Rule
Under the rule of strict liability, an individual is liable whenever he
causes harm (regardless of whether he is negligent). We will now compare the
gain-based measure of liability to the harm-based measure under this rule in
the three cases discussed in Section 3.
4.1. No Errors
In this case, if liability is set equal to h, an individual will engage
in the harmful act if and only if g >h,and the first-best outcome will be
achieved. If liability is set equal to g, an individual will be deterred from
engaging in the act regardless of g and h. This outcome is undesirable
whenever g >h.Thus, if there are no errors in observing gain or harm, harm-
based liability is superior to gain-based liability.
4.2. Errors Anticjpated
Suppose first that only the gain is observed with error. Then under
harm-based liability, individuals will engage in the harmful act if and only
if g >h,again resulting in the first-best outcome. Under gain-based
liability, if gain is underestimated, an individual will engage in the harmful
act regardless of h. This results in a social loss of h -gif g <h.
Alternatively, if gain is overestimated, the individual will be deterred
regardless of h, resulting in a social loss •of g -hif g >h.Thus, when
only gain is observed with error and the error is anticipated, harm-based
liability is superior to gain-based liability.
Although this is the same conclusion that was reached under the
negligence rule when gain alone is observed incorrectly, the explanation
differs somewhat. There the Inefficiency of gain-based liability was that it
le many individuals to engage in the harmful act then their gain was less
-11-than harm. That problem remains under strict liability. In addition, gain-
bas.d liability now deters many individuals whose gain exceeds harm.
Next suppose that both gain and harm are observed with error. Under the
harm-based measure, some individuals whose gain is less than harmwillengage
in the act --thosefor whom h +v<g<h--andsome individuals whose gain
exceeds harm will not engage in the act --thosefor whom h < g < h +
Likewise,under the gain-based measure, some individuals whose gain is less
than harm will engage in the act --thosefor whom g +y< g < h -_andsome
individuals whose gain exceeds harm will not engage in the act -- thosefor
whom h <g<g+-y.Hence, as was the case under the negligence rule, either
harm-based or gain-based liability could in principle be superior.
But again, although the two measures cannot be ranked unambiguouslywhen
both gain andharm areobserved with error andtheerrors are anticipated,
harm-based liability is superior to gain-based liability in the previously
described sense. Specifically, harm-based liability is preferable when the
maximum error with respect to harm,t,isbelow a threshold, but gain-based
liability is not necessarily superior to harm-based liability even if the
maximum error with respect to gain, 1u,issmall.15
4.3. Errors Not Anticipated
In this case, an individual's expected liability under the harm-based
measure is h, since the error, ,,hasmean zero. Therefore, an individual
will engage in the harmful act if and only if g >h,and the first-best
outcome will be achieved. Under the gain-based measure, the individual's
expected liability is g since the error, y, has mean zero, and so he will be
In the special case in which only the estimation of harm is subject to
error, it is readily shown that harm-based liability is superior to gain-based
liability if rjissufficiently low.
-12-deterred from engaging in the act regardless of g and h. This outcome is
undesirable whenever g > h. Thus, when errors are not anticipated, harm-based
liability is superior to gain-based liability.16
5.Concluding Remarks
(a)As we noted in the introduction, in practice liability sometimes
depends on gains. This might be because an injurer's gain is easier to
calculate than the victim's harm. For example, the amount of money saved by
not installing pollution control equipment may be more readily ascertainable
than the harm suffered by victims of pollution. But it could be a mistake
nonetheless to base liability on the injurer's gain. For as we have seen, if
the gain is underestimated -- thecost of controlling pollution might be
greater than the enforcement authority calculates -- substantialharmcan
occur. As a general policy, it may be better to base liability on a victim's
harm even though the harts can only be approximated, because if the harm is
great in relation to the gain, the harmful act is likely tobe deterred.
(b) Although our focus has been on comparing measures of liability
under the negligence rule, it is worth repeating here why the gain-based
measure is inferior to the harm-based measure under the strict liabilityrule:
the gain-based measure not only would lead many individuals to engage in the
harmful act when their gains are far less than harm, it also would deter many
individuals whose gains far exceed harm. In other words, under the strict
liability rule, the gain-based measure also would result in a chilling effect
on socially desirable behavior. It therefore is not surprising thatthe gain-
16 This result also holds in the special cases in which gain alone or
harm alone is estimated with error.
-13-based measure does not appear to be used under that rule.
(c) In our model we assumed that harm occurs with certainty if an
individual engages in an act. In many contexts, however, harm occurs oniy
with a probability. Then harm-based liability is superior to gain-based
liability even in the absence of errors in observing harm and gain: Under
gain-based liability, an individual will not be deterred from engaging in a
socially undesirable act because he will have to disgorge his gain only with a
probability (when harm occurs). Under harm-based liability, however, he will
be deterred. For example, suppose that an act results in a gain of $100 and
creates a fifty percent chance of a harm of $500. Since the expected harm is
$250, the act is socially undesirable. Under gain-based liability, the
individual's expected liability is fifty percent of $100, or $50 --whichwill
not deter him -- whereasunder harm-based liability, his expected liability is
$250 -- whichwill deter him.
(d) We did not consider victims' incentives to avoid harm in our
analysis. Under the negligence rule, this factor favors gain-based liability
because, whenever negligence is found, the resulting level of liability will
be lower than under harm-based liability, which will induce victims to take
more care because they will have more to lose. Under the strict liability
rule, the implication of this factor is ambiguous because the gain-based
measure may be greater than or less than the harm-based measure. In any case,
the importance of this issue is limited by the fact that the law generally
circumscribes victims' ability to collect damages when they have not made
reasonable efforts to avoid harm.
(e) Another factor omitted from the analysis is risk aversion and
compensation. This consideration favors harm-based liability if victims are
-14-more risk-averse than injurers (because harm-based liability, by definition,
attempts to make victims whole) and gain-based liability in the reverse
case (because, by removing an injurer's gain, gain-based liability keeps the
injurer's utility stable). However, the relevance of risk aversion is
attenuated by the general ability of parties to purchase insurance.
(f) Finally, we did not take into account the costs of imposing monetary
sanctions. Such costs often are substantial. For example, in non-auto tort
litigation, nearly a dollar of legal fees and related expenses is incurred for
every dollar of liability borne by thedefendant.17 The existence of such
costs makes lower levels of liability more appealing, other things being
equal. This suggests that a modified form of gain-based liability might be
superior to harm-based liability under the negligence rule. Specifically,
suppose that the level of liability is set equal to the injurer's gain plus an
additional amount to ensure that, even if the gain is underestimated,
deterrence will occur with a high probability. By design, this variation of
gain-based liability will not suffer significantly from the problem of
underdeterrence that characterizes the gain-based measure we analyzed.
Moreover, presuming that the resulting level of liability is less than harm,
this alternative will generate lower administrative costs than harm-based
liability.
17SeeHensler, Vaiana, Kakalik, and Peterson (1987, pp. 25-29).
15 -Avtendlx
The appendix proves the results stated in subsection 3.2 regarding the
sense in which harm-based liability is superior to gain-based liability when
both gain and harm are observed with error and the errors are anticipated.
Recall thatisthe maximum error that can occur in observing gain and
is the maximum error that can occur in observing harm.
It was shown in subsection 3.2 that when only gain is observed with
error --inwhich case M—-- harm-basedliability is superior to gain-
based liability. It is obvious that as -.0,the outcome under harm-based
liability approaches the outcome when t— 0.It follows that if i is
positive but sufficiently small, harm-based liability also dominates gain-
based liability.
To explain why gain-based liability does not necessarily become superior
to harm-based liability even as -,0,assume that, for all positive -y.,the
probability that the error regarding gain is negative is at least k for some
positive k. (This is a weak assumption and would be satisfied, for instance,
by any symmetric distribution of error, in which case k —.5.)Then, no
matter how smallis(providedispositive), under gain-based liability
the likelihood of the party engaging in the act is at least k for all g, and
in particular, for g <h.It follows that under gain-based liability, the
social loss -- thedeviation in social welfare from the first-best
outcome -- isbounded away from zero when aggregated over the situations in
which negligence is found)' Thus, even ifisvery small, the social loss
There also is a social loss in situations in which negligence is not
found. But because the measure of liability is immaterial when negligence is
not found, this social loss is the same under both measures. Hence, only the
social loss in situations in which negligence is found is relevant to the
comparison of the wo measures.
-16-under gainbased liability may exceed thesocial loss under hans-based
liability.
The analysis under the strict liability rule is essentiallythe same as
under the negligence rule.
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